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In the Suprente Court of ·the
State of Utal1

DALE BERKELEY WILSON,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

CASE
~0. 7969.

DR. MERRILL L. OLDROYD,

Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT•s BRIEF ON APPELLANT'S
PETITION FOR REHEARING
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .

.The appellant bases his petition for a rehearing upon .
four contentions, Each of his points was ·fully con~idered·
by this Court in- arriving at its, decision, and the arguments
advanced in the petition for rehearing were either expressly_
or impliedly rejected. The only contention that .:was not.
expressly rul~ upon i$ the _fi.rst PQit:It urged by .appellant
relating to the claimed depreciation of appellant's finances,.
and we shall notice that one in most detail hereafter. On
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the other points we can best refer primarily to ow~ former
brief and the decision of this Court which fully cover them.
All appellant's present argument amounts to is that
defendant's testimony should not have been believed. We
shall point out h~reafter that the testimony was really conservative as to the wealth of the defendant, and that if thP.
Court may, as appellant now contends, look outside the
record, then there are other substantial property interests
that were not included in the record. Ho\vever, a complete
ans\ver at the threshhold appears to be that there is nothing involved in the petition on that phase which indicates
anything other than that the appellant does not agree \vith
the values placed by the jury or this Court as to the matter
of damages. No matter \vhat result is reached, appellant
no doubt will never agree, in view of ·his persistence in the
matter of interference with the marriage and his determination to avoid any substantial financial responsibility
as indicated by the record.
Before considering the points in order in more detail,
however, we desire to note a matter contained in appellant's preliminary statement, and a separate n1atter contained in a letter addressed to the Chief Justice and apparently accompanying appellant's Petition and Brief on Rehearing. The first, is the request of the appellant that the
Chie.f Justice participate in the ruling on his motion, notwithstanding the stipulation of the parties at the time of
the oral argument, and notwithstanding the fact that Chief
Justice Wolfe did not participate in the· decision deciding this
case, and that the same situation has obtained \Vith respect
to other cases similarly decided apparently without question
from any source, and that four members of the Court which
acted in this and numerous other cases are a constitutional
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com~t

fully authorized to finally decide the issues under the

law and the practice of the court.
We have too ntuch confidence in Chief Justice Wolfe

and this Honorable Court to suppose that the considerations \Vhich brought about the original decision without his
participation \vould be changed merely be·cause the result
\Vent against the appellant, and because appellant asks for
this special dispensation. We are confident that no difference in the result would be achieved by carrying such suggestion out, but think it is uncalled for and unjustified.
The additional request contained in the separate letter
to the Chief Justice seems equally unusual and presumptuous. It is therein requested that the "Petition for rehearing submitted herewith be

set down for oral

argument be-

fore the Court on an appropriate law and motion day." If
all petitions for rehearing could be argued orally before

their merits appeared from the briefs in support thereof,
this Honorable Court could hardly perform its other work.
Moreover, it does appear that this request .takes matters
too much for granted, and in view of the petition's lack of
merit, we do not think it is entitled to consideration.
No merit appearing on the face of the petition and brief
in support thereof, we do not think this case should be

treated differently than any other case, and we are confident that it will not be, despite the requests and suggestions above mentioned.
We turn now to the specific points covered by appellant's arguments in support of this petition.
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POINT ONE
THE COURT AND THE JURY WHICH TRIED THE
CASE IN THE COURT BELOW WERE UNDER NO rviiSAPPREHENSION AS TO THE FINANCIAL WEALTH
OF THlE DEFEl\TDANT AND DEFENDANT'S 0\VN
SWO~RN TESTilVIONY SET OUT THAT FINANCIAL
WEALTI-1 CONSERV:ATIVELY TO THE ADVANTAGE
OF THE DEFENDANT.

Appllant claims that the jury misapprehended the financial wealth.of the defendant. Respondent introduced no
independent evidence as to financial wealth, but relied wholly on the defendant's O\vn sworn testimony, as the jury had
the right to do. This evidence was considered under proper
instruct~ons as to ptmitive damages. The statement in appellant's brief that counsel for plaintiff spent more, tima
pointing out the wealth of the defendant than they did in
arguing the merits of the case, can be explained only by
the fact that presumably the one who wrote appellant's
brief was not present at the trial. If he had been present,
we are sure he would not have asserted this as a fact, any
more than it would be true as to our arguments before tllis
Court up to the present time. However, \Ve are nO\v impelled by appellant's insistence to consider this matter of
finances in some detail.
The evidence was undisputed, and there was no testimony on the point, except that of defendant himelf, which
both sides accepted with its reasonable inferences and by
which both sides are now bound.
The comment of this Court that "Dr. Oldroyd is not
only·· a successful practitioner, but also has considerable
wealth in sheep, lands and other properties aggregating to
several multiples of the judg1nent rendered against him" is

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
attacked by the appellant. The only possible groWlds for
attacking such statement would be to attack the veracity
of the defendant hin1Self, and we· do not think it should lie
in the n1outh of the appellant to attack this Court on the
ground that his own s\vorn testimony should not have been
given any .credence b~ the jury or this Court. Moreover,
if \Ve may look outside the record as appellant now is seeking to do, it is likely that his assets considerably exceed in
value that \Vhich he admitted at the trial, as hereafter will
be seen.
It is no\V claimed by appellant that his ,Court misconceived the evidence with respect to finances. Certainly,
the pWlitive damages of $5,000.00 fixed by this Court's
mandate do not indicate any unrealistic attitude as. to appellant's finances, unless it is the substantial crinsideration
accorded to appellant as indiGated by a $20,000.00 reduction in punitive damages.
The ariDlillent of appellant on pages 7-8 of his brief
purports to summarize his worth at the time of the trial as
only $146,000.00 to $200,000.00 rather than as several times
the amotmt of the judgment. As a preface to this, appellant argues that the Court can take judicial notice of what
happened to the ·livestock industry in the Spring of 1952.
The first inference indulged in is that since Dr. Oldroyd
gave his deposition, February 15th, 1952, and before the
trial which occurred in the latter part of November, 1952,
the value of his property depreciated. The fact is that
when Dr. Oldroyd gave his depasition in February, 1952,
he gave the value of sheep per head as $35.00, or a total of
$94,000.00, without reference to his permits, \Vhich were

separately referred to. Thereafter, when he had had full
opportunity for consideration and consultation from the
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standpoint of his O\vn interest, he corrected his deposition
to read $30.00 per head, which would give him a total value
of the sheep of $81,000.00. At the trial his deposition was
introduced in evidence by plaintiff. If it had not correctly
reflected values as of the time of trial, Dr. Oldroyd could
have corected the deposition still again or explained what
his true worth \Vas, but he was \Villing to submit the matter
on his own estimates as to his worth, and did not question
this evidence directly or indirectly. There was a very good
reason for this, which will be apparent when we examine
the question of what the Court might judicially know according to counsel for appellant. l-Ie 1nust have known that
his deposition placed his worth at much less than it really
was if all the facts were inquired into.
. Nor do we think it is sound to say that irrespective of
what the evidence is in the record on values, and irrespective of the willingness of the appellant to accept that evidence without question at the trial and until the decision
of this Court, still a rehearing should be granted because
appellant's petition for rehearing suggests that the Court
can take judicial notice of a ·current economic condition in
conflict with the valuations in the record as established by
the defendant himself. Is it meant that if general conditions have changed since a trial, a verdict should be increased by an appellate court if the change is ascending,
and reduced if the subsequent change is downward? Or is
the contention that this Court should disregard the undisputed record in relation to values at the time of the trial,
and. decide the cases in disregard of the jury's verdict on the
basis of general ideas as to value based upon the theory
of judicial notice, or some other theory? Either vie'v seen1s
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so fraught ''"ith objection as to ha1·dly justify further argwnent.
'\Ve also do not believe that judicial notice will permit
this Court to revise the estimate of value which the record
discloses and \Vhich, as \ve pointed out in our brief, indicates the net worth of the defendant by his own testimony
to be in excess of a quarter of a million dollars, or more
than three times the original verdict of the jury and more
than four times the existing judgment as reduced by this
Court. If an ordinary citizen injures another by negligence
in, for instance, an automobile accident, or by design in a
·battery-case, it is not unusual for the court to enter judgment which, to pay, may take everything which such defendant possesses. It \vould seem no objection to an other\vis~ just judgment that after its satisfaction, Dr. Oldroyd
may have something less than a quarter of a million dollars
in assets rather than something over such amount, if by Dr.
Oldroyd's present insistence this matter is even considered
in ·connection with the total judgment. On the question of
punitive damages as reduced by this Court, there would
seem to be no point whatsoever in appellant's argument.
Actually, the judgment being lawful and just, if it took
everything he had this would -be no objection from a legal
standpoint, and he should take some satisfaction in the
thought that while he was interfering with the plaintiff's
~home and holding out inducements to plaintiff's wife, he
was willing to hazard everything he had for her, as it finaly turns out, he is saving by far the greatest portion of his
fortune which he did so persistently hazard.
Appellant argues .in his brief that if any of his assets
are sold to pay the judgment at a price above their purchase
price, Federal income tax would apply. If the present val-
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ues \vere as nominal as. appellant indicates no\v, any capital
gain would not be likely, but at best this seems a somewhat
specious argument. His liquid assets alone, if considered
at their true value, either by way of sale or borrowing,
would permit him to pay off the judgment, leaving him his
sheep herd, cattle, land and considerable additional property
\Vhich, as we shall point out, could still well be \Vorth a quarter of a million dollars.
This vvill be a very favorable position in which he will
be left compared with the position the evidence shows he
left Dale Wilson and his home. This talk or suggestion of
forced sale is nonsense, since the record indicates that except for the judgment, he owes no one and that if he desired, he could take care of this judgment with no substantial difficulty-considerably less difficulty than is usually
present in paying off the ordinary judgment by the ordinary
individual.
The appellant apparently had no difficulty in immediately putting up a good and sufficient supercedeas bond in
the sum of $85,000.00. Of course, in the meantime, he may
have felt free to adjust or dispose of his personal property
by reason of this bond, but he apparently is in a better position than it was contemplated he n1ight have been \vhen
the amount of the bond was fixed.
These observations are pertinent to answer appellant's
present argument and inferences, even upon appellant's
theory of value, based upon matters which do not appear
of r~cord but which appellant's counsel suppose justify them
in ~a~ing the enumeration of values s.et out on page 8 of
his brief. If the ability to pay the judgment is immaterial,
as \Ve think it is, except as to punitive damages then ap-
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pellant's present argument and 1nuch of this answering argument should be disregarded, except as it negatives the
contention that either this Court ·or the trial court misconceived the evidence as to finances. If they have any bearing,
the misleading assertions in appellant's brief cannot be permitted to stand unchallenged. Apparently appellant's enumeration has been arranged to indicate a total of just under
t\vice the original judgment of $75,000.00, so as to permit
appellant's criticism of this Court's language that he was
worth several multiples the amount of the initial judgment.
A mere cursory examination of appellant's enumeration will show that this is so rmrealistic·as to almost·amount
to a confession of this on its face. If this Court. be autho-ized to disregard the record before the trial court and take
judicial notice of the true facts, as appellant's argument
seems to infer, defendant's wealth is even more impressive:
than might otherwise be assumed.
For instance, Dr. Oldroyd no\v itemizes the sheep at
$10.00 per head,. instead of the $35.00 per head he .testified
to in his deposition they \Vere worth, and instead of the
$30.00 per head he later revised his figures to indicate. In
other words, by some theory of depreciation or judicial no-·
tice, notwithstanding he offered no evidence of this at .the
trial, he now infers that between February, when he gave
his deposition, and the time of. the trial, the value of his,
sheep had decreased by 300%. We believe he considerably
understated the value of his-property initially and failed· to
mention considerable other property he owned. But even
taking the $30.00 .or $35.00 per head figures which he gave
and assuming the sheep were-only 2700 head at the· time of.
the trial and notwithstanding that between February and
the trial he would have had a substantial crop of lambs
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ready for market, still a reference to the Commodity Year
Book, 1953, indicates that between February and November, 1952, the decline in average prices received by farmers
for sheep was substantially less than one-sixth of the decline claimed by Dr. Oldroyd in the case of sheep and far
less than that in the case of lambs. For the same period,
the decline in the price of wool was less than 10%. Despite
this, in November, 1952, if the Court can take judicial notice of livestock prices, sheep were still selling, with summer permit, at more than $35.00 per head, and the winter
permit would come extra.
On this question of permits, Dr. ~Oldroyd's deposition
gave the value of sheep without reference to permits, yet
he has summer permit for 2695 head of sheep and a winter
permit for 3000 head. A point is made that permits have
no separate value or saleability. It is true that these permits cannot be sold separately, but they can be waived by
the owner of sheep and the summer as well as the \vinter
permit each enhances the value of the sheep sold by at least
$7.50 and usually by $10.00 per head or more.
Appellant lists his cattle at $100.00 per head. The
Conunodity Index shows the average price of cattle received
by farmers in November, 1952, to be n1ore than 20c per
pound, which would make any herd worth considerably in
excess of what appellant claims, if composed of ordinary
stock. If beef steers or any special type are involved, the
price would be substantially higher. A minimwn value, it
would seem, would be $150.00 per head.
Dr. Oldroyd in his brief lists 4680 acres of range land,
and sets the price at $5.00 per acre. If the Court may take
judicial notice of the actual value for ordinary range land,
that value, we believe, would be approximately $10.00 per
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acre and nlight be substantially more if choice range or a
part of an integrated sheep operation were involved. However, actually Dr. Oldi·oyd testified that he had only 4500
acres of range land, but 180 acres of pasture land. As an
example of the desperate effort he has indulged in in his
attempt to cut his \\~ealth do,vn several multiples of the
original judgn1ent, it \Viii be noted that he has lumped the
pasture land in \vith the range land, at $5.00 an acre. The.
pasture land, near Payson, 1nust be \Vorth from $50.00 to
$150.00 per acre. Appellant no\V values the automobiles,
saddle horses and farm equipment testified to by him at a
total of $4,000.00. It would be unusual if the two automobiles O\vned by him \vere not worth $4,000.00 alone, but the
farm equipment and horses would probably bring theamount well above this figure.
Appellant says that his accounts receivable are worth
only a small percentage of their face value. There is nothing in the record to show that those he specified were not.
~llectible accoWlts, and it will not be presumed that he
gave a value to, or included, worthless accounts, although.
there may be some credit loss. He did not even mention
his medical equipment, office equipment, life insurance, and·
such things, which \Ve believe it is a fair inference he has,
and \Vhich would be of substantial value. Nor does he, in
his list, include the value of his grazing permits, his home
or his bank account, nor his 1952 wool or lamb crop, nor his
purely personal effects. His bank stock he shows at $12.50
a share par, whereas 'he testified under oath in February,
1952, that it \Vas valued at $30.00. There is no reason why
every inference should be taken in his favor, and despite
his later statement it was only $12.50 per share, par, there·
is no question but that its actual value is the $30.00 p~r
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share to which he originally testified. There is no evidence
or any indication in the record or by judicial notice, that
it has declined in value since his original testimony.
Thus, it appears that the enwneration of .assets contained on page 8 of appellant's present brief, his figures being set out in the first column below, must. be revised to
accord with. the probable facts along the lines indicated in.
the second column below:

Appellant's
Present Claim
2700 head of .sheep .

Minimum additional value
by reason of summer&
wi:nter permits
50 head of cattle
4500 acres of range land ·

Probable
Minimum
Value

$27,000

$81,000

No value set out

$40,500

$5,000

$7,500

$23,400

$45,000

(with pasture land)
No value beyond the
above $5 per acre

$9,000

$35,000

$30,000

Secured debts

$30,000

$30,000

Government bonds

$8,000

$8,000

Miscellaneous automobiles,
horses & farm equipment

$4,000

$6,000

I000 shares bank stock

$12,500

$30,000

Home and office

No value given

$15,000

Checking accormt

No value given

$2,000

180 acres of pasture land

Accounts

r~eivable
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1953

\VOOl

crop

No value given
No value given

1952 lamb crop
Medical and office
equipment

No value given

Insurance

No value given

$4,000

$307,000

vVhere no probable nlinimum value is given in the last
column above, \Ve feel the evidence may not be sufficient
to permit a reasonably accurate estin1ate, although we also
feel that the additional value would be substantial. Suffice
it to say that the total on the right seems most conservative.
If some of the values given do not appear expressly from the
record, it is also true that the reduced values which appellant now seeks to volunteer also do not appear, and in most
cases, conflict \Vith the record. From the record or from
any facts of \Vhich the Court can take judicial notice, we
think the appellant's present claims are unsupported. We
think that the least that can be said is \Vhat the Court said
that the \Vealth of the· defendant was in several multiples
of the judgment, and as \Ve stated in our original brief after
quoting Dr. Oldroyd on values:
7

"It thus appears that by Dr. Oldroyd's O\vn original
valuations, he has property worth approximately $194,000.00 and in addition the folowlng property upon
which he did not place a value: 50 ·head of cattle, 4,500
acres of grazing land of which he had a deeded title,
a winter permit for 3000 head of sheep and a summer
permit for 2695 sheep, 180 acres of pasture land near
Payson, two automobiles, farm eq1:1ipment, sad~~ h<?-rses and a home. Considering the latter property ·as of
minimum value, it seems fair to say that the defendant
is worth wen over a quarter of a million dollars."
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We have herein mentioned the defendant's wealth more
than we have heretofore referred to it throughout all the
course of this proceeding, when we have mentioned it only
in passing in connection with punitive damages. We felt
that discussion now has been made necessary by his nlisleading and unfair last-minute claims concerning his finances. Rather than attempt to protect himself against
any improper evidence as to wealth, he is using his own
representations in an atternpt to further reduce or avoid
the effects. of the judgment. The evidence of his finances
was properly received and properly submitted to the jury
on the issue of punitive damages, which is not now questioned. We do not think the real issue should now be avoided; that the fixing of da1nages was a matter for the jury,
and that certainly when this Court has reduced punitive
damages to_$5,000.00, there is no further point in appellant's
· present effort. . We think the opinion of this. Court itself
is the best answer to this effort.
POINT TWO
THE COURT AND JURY IGNORED NO EVIDENCE
GOING TO THiE NATURE OF THE MARRIAGE RELATION, AND THE APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS IN THIS
RESPECT HAVE BEEN FULLY CONSIDERED AND
PROPERLY RULED UPON.

I;n his brief under the section corresponding to the foregoing proposition in which appellant argues the contrary
conclusion, it is urged by him, in a single paragraph, that
the Court should reverse itself because plaintiff admitted
that on two occasions he had some prior trouble with his
wife. These same points were asserted and reiterated before the jury, on the motion for new trial, and before this
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Cotu-1 in previous briefs. They \vere fully considered by
this Court in its detennination. There seems no tnerit
whatsoever in appellant's contention. At least one of these
occasions \Vas probably before the discovery of Dr. Oldroyd's association but after its inception. Both were matters properly_ submitted to the jury under proper instructions. They, \Vith all other relevant circumstances, are disposed of by the jury verdict and the decision of this Court.
Concerning this point there \vould seem to be no purpose
of repeating the discussion thereof in ow.. original brief and
in appellant's prior briefs, \Vhich are hereby referred to.
POINT THREE
-THE OPINION OF THIS COURT IS SOUl~D IN
HOLDING THAT THERE IS NOTHING FROM vVHICH
IT CAt"~ BE DETERMINED THAT THE VERDICT WAS
REACHED AS A RESULT OF PASSION AND PREJUDICE.
Under the corresponding heading in appellant's brief,
the case of Smith v. Sheffield, 58 Utah 77, 197 Pac. 605, is
again refen--ed to, although it \Vas cited and fully exploited in
the previous brief of appellant. As a matter of fact, the only
cases cited in appellant's present brief which were not fully
presented in previous briefs are Evans v. Gaisford, 247 P.2d
431; Collins v. Hughes & Riddle, 278 1\TW 889; and Lehman
v. Newnan Transit Co., Civil No. 97011, Third District
Cow't. Evans v. Gaisford is entirely consistent with the rules
adopted by this Court and is fully considered and cited in
the Court's opinion herein. Collins v. Hughes & Riddle was
a Nebraska case decided rnore than fifteen years ago,. and
is one of the few cases that are in conflict with the long line
of Utah cases considered and cited or referred to and fol-
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lowed by this Court in arriving at its decision herein. The
decision of Judge Ellett in the District Court case for all that
appears n1ay have been justified under the particular facts
in that case, and involved the discretion and judgment of a
fact finder on a motion for new trial, which judgment in
the case at bar was ·contrary to appellant's contention. Be
that as it may, this District Court opinion can hardly be
held ·to overrule the decisions of this Court. Judge Hoyt
declined to make any reduction on the motion for new trial
by reason of the special facts before· him. Judge Ellett on
another state of facts, did so. This Court has arrived at
its O\vn judgment on appeal.
In an· effort to show that the verdict \Vas excessive,
appellant refers to a statement made by plaintiff a number
of months before this action ·Was instituted and before Dr.
Oldroyd had demonstrated a con1plete unwillingness to discontinue his interference with plaintiff's home in spite of
promises, to the effect that $10,000 or $15,000 wouldn't hurt
defendant very much. We \VOUld certainly agree that any
such amount would not hurt him, but would be a mere license or invitation for a continuation of such conduct. Appellant indicates that since the jury brought back five times
the amotmt the plaintiff so ufixed", a rehearing should be
granted. or the verdict set aside. On the contrary, the
amount fixed by. the plaintiff was the amount demanded in
the complaint, $100,000.00. The mention of the first
amounts can no more require a decrease of the a\vard below
the $55,000.00 detern1ined by this Court than the mention
of the $100,000.00 in the complaint can require this Court
to increase such award.· We do not·believe· that there can
be any persuasion or merit in appellant's contention in this
respect ..
I
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POINT FOUR
TillS COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING TI-IA'f
THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN THE INSTRUCTIONS, ...l\ND THE DECISION OF THIIS CO~URT
IS SOU:t\TD AND \\7ELL CONSIDERED IN THIS RESPECT.
Appllant again urges that the giving of instruction No.
6 \Vas prejudicial error, and says that this Court has ignored
\vithout overruling \Vell established cases in this jurisdiction.
Only one case is cited in this connection, the same one cited
in support of the same contention in appellant's original
brief. As in his original brief, appellant no\v mentions and
emphasizes only a part of instruction No. 6, and ignores the
several other instructions which positively instructed the
jury in accordance \Vith the very law as to liability and damages which, apparently, appellant no\v is willing to concede
is correct.
Substantially the san1e argument no\v made was made
by appellant in his prior brief and in the oral argun1ent
before this Court. Reference is made to pages 50-52 of appellant's original brief in which the same argument is made
as herein made, it being argued that the instruction said to
the jury, "Even though the evidence may convince you be~
yond question that the marriage bet\veen the Wilsons was
so strained that it appears that it could not have been re.
paired, still you way (sic) not find on that basis, for in the
eyes of the law so long as the marriage relationship existed,
it may have been repaired and you may return damages on
the basis that it would have been repaired.'' This interpretation, as shown in our brief, was Unjustified by_ even- thefragment of instruction No. 6 selected by the appellant, and
when considered in connection with the full instruction and
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all the other instructions in the case, there could not have
been any possible error or prejudice. The case relied upon
had no application to the instructions in the instant case,
as will be readily seen from a comparison of the instructions, neither of which the appellant has cared to quote in
full, since their very statement would disprove his argument.
In the instant case, unlike the Buckley case, it \Vas left
entirely to the jury to determine the question of affection
or lack of affection, and the damages· resulting in defendant's interference, if any. In fact, Judge Hoyt was especially circumspect and liberal to the appellant in the instructions, stating, reiterating and reiterating that "if a person
causes the wife to give up her affection, if any, for her husband, or to desert or refuse to live with her husband, then
he is liable in damages to the husband'' . . . . (Inst. 6)
"If you find from the evidence tha:t plaintiff's wife determined to separate from the plaintiff because of the acts or
conduct of the plaintiff and without wrongful encouragement or inducement from the defendant, then the defendant
should not be held liable; in any event you should not hold
the defendant liable unless you find from a preponderance
of the evidence that wrongful acts or conduct on the part of
the defendant were the controlling cause of inducing the
plaintiff's wife to withdraw her affection from plaintiff or
to cease her association with him as his wife", (Inst. No.7)
. . . "If you believe that plaintiff's wife fell in love
with, or transferred her affection, to the defendant without
any affirmative inducement or encouragement from the defendant, then the defendant should not be held liable herein" (Inst. 5)
. "If you believe that the acts or
conduct of the plaintiff himself toward his wife, or any other
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cause than the acts o1· conduct of the defendant constituted
the controlling cause of plaintiff's \Vife's desertion of plaintiff, then the defendant should not be held liable'' (lnst. 4)
"Unless you find from the preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant intentionally encouraged and induced the
plaintiff's \vife to give to him, the defendant, her love and
affection, or to abandon her association with the plaintiff
as his \Vife or to \Vithdra\v her affection from the plaintiff,
then yow'" verdict on plaintiff's complaint should be for the
defendant no cause of action" (Inst. 3)
. . . "If you
find from a preponderance of tl1e evidence and under the
instructions of the court that the plaintiff is entitled to damages against the defendant then you should award plaintiff
such amotu1t of damages as you believe from the evidence
will constitute reasonable and just cornpensation for whatever loss or injury or mental or physical pain or suffering,
if any~ resulted to plaintiff as a direct or proximate consequence of \vrongful acts of the defendant set forth in the
complaint . . . You should consider the state of feelings existing between the plaintiff and ·his wife prior to the
acts complained of . . . the probability or improbability of the continuance of their association as husband
and \Vife and whether the plaintiff suffered much or little
because of defendant's acts . . . If you find the plaintiff is entitled to damages, award him reasonable and just
compensation for whatever loss, injury, humiliation or pain
or mental suffering, if any, you find from the evidence has
been, or hereafter \Vill be, caused to plaintiff by defendant's
acts complained of" (lnst. 8) . . . "You are the sole
and exclusive judges of the facts in the case and it is. for
you to decide whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to damages . . . If you find that the plaintiff is entitled to
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damages, then you should consider the foregoing instruction in determining the amount of damages, but if you find
that the plaintiff is not entitled to damages then you should
entirely disregard the instruction of the court as to measure of damages." (Inst. 9)
· \Ve will nqt attempt to further outline the instructions.
The foregoing will indicate that the court was fair and generous ~with appellant in stating his theories, and that the
arguments and reasoning of appellant now ignore the actual instructions given and the obvious difference between
them and_ those jn the case relied upon. vVe submit that
this Court's ·analysis and reasoning in ·view of the actual
record iOn ·this point is a complete, and should be a final,
answer .to these renewed contentions.
CONCLUSIONS

That these four points, as groundless as they appear,
are the only criticism of the final decision of this Court in.
a case ·so vigorously and persistently contested by the ap-.
pellant·at every stage, and in view of the other attacks made
upon the· judgment initially, bespeaks well for the decision
in its present form. Because we have singled out these· four
points- for discussion, and particularly the matter of finances, there, no doubt,· has been a tendency to over-emphasize
them as does appellant's petition for rehearing. It is only in
trying to meet these remaining argtunents that we are led
into the discussion·, and we primarily rely upon our basic
positions as stated in our principal brief, which brief is hereby referred to for greater detail, and upon ·the· decision of
this Court as a whole, which, we submit, is fair, sound and
just and which we hereby refer to as a correct statement
of the· law and the applicable rules, notwithstanding there-
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duction of the judgment as granted by this Court against
us. Anyone reading only this brief and the brief in support
of the petition for rehearing might \Veil lose sight of the
really important phases of the decision, and \Ve thus desire
to emphasize otu· belief that on the points mentioned by appellant no\v, as \\'ell as on the many equally as important
or more important points apparently now conceded by appellant the decision is \veil considered and complete.
There is nothing ne\v and substantial presented in the
petition for rehearing and brief in support thereof. There
is no justification for a rehearing in this case, and its only
excuse \Vould be the persistence of the appellant to prevail
herein and to avoid responsibility, which dete1mination is
only a continuation of his persistence in pursuing his interference in Dale \'7ilson's home, commented on by the Court's.
opinion herein, \Vilson v. Oldroyd, 267 P.2d 759 at p. 765.
This persistence \vas repeatedly evident even after he had
been detected and had promised Wilson that he would not
interfere further.
Counsel for appellant states that members of the Bar
and the lay public with whom he has talked have expressed
surprise and amazement at the size of· the verdict. We
might indicate our observation that mem·bers of the lay
public and the Bar with whom we have talked have expressed the feeling that the verdict was entirely proper in
view of the special circumstances. Certainly the jury and
the trial court sincerely so believed, and certainly this Court
in its decision as to the reduced amount so believed. Moreover, it is generally believed that the institutions of home
and marriage have received needed support and strength in
the stand of the jury and the fairness and soundness of the
decision of this Court. Everyone may not be completely
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satisfied. Certainly the defendant will not be in any event,
and the plaintiff could \Veil have regretted the reduction of
$20,000 as granted the appellant by this Court. Courts, of
course, do not function merely to satisfy either Mr. Oldroyd
or Mr. Wilson, or others who may comment on the case.
This Court having spoken, courageously but fairly, it is no
reason for another result that Dr. Oldroyd and those to
whom his counsel assume to refer may have views different
than those expressed by others, or that others on the sidelines may disagree with counsel for appellant.
We submit that the case has been fully, carefully and
fairly considered as it has progressed through the trial court
and through this Court; that the points no\v urged by appellant are either entirely without merit or have, been properly and correctly resolved~ both as to law and fact; that the
decision of this Court is sound and just; that there is no
reason why special rules of procedure or substance should
be extended to the appellant; that the decision of this Court
should stand and that the Petition for Rehearing should be
forthwith denied.
A. ·H. CHRISTENSON
A. SHERMAN CHRISTENSON
PHILLIP V. CHRISTENSON
for CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON

Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent
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